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UCLA	Center	for	the	Study	of	International	Migration	
Forum	on	Race	and	Citizenship	in	Postwar	France	
Debating	Native	to	the	Republic:		Empire,	Social	Citizenship,	and	Everyday	Life	in	
Marseille	since	1945,	by	Minayo	Nasiali,	Ithaca,	NY:	Cornell	University	Press,	2016	
Comments	by:	
Lia	Brozgal,	Department	of	French	and	Francophone	Studies,	UCLA	
Swanie	Potot,	Swanie	Potot,	Research	Unit	on	Migration	and	Society,	French	National	Center	
for	Scientific	Research	(CNRS)	
Response	by:	
Minayo	Nasiali,	Department	of	History,	UCLA	
	
	 The	UCLA	Center	for	the	Study	of	International	Migration	is	delighted	to	issue	this	
working	paper	devoted	to	a	discussion	of	a	book	by	Minayo	Nasiali,	Native	to	the	Republic:		
Empire,	Social	Citizenship,	and	Everyday	Life	in	Marseille	since	1945	(Ithaca,	NY:	Cornell	
University	Press,	2016).		The	working	paper	is	a	by-product	of	an	“Author	meets	critics”	session,	
organized	by	the	Center	and	held	on	October	6,	2017.		Given	the	importance	of	the	book	on	
which	this	session	focused,	and	the	quality	of	the	ensuing	debate,	we	thought	that	the	results	
of	the	conversation	should	be	opened	up	to	the	public;	hence,	this	working	paper.	While	the	
documents	to	follow	have	been	revised	by	the	authors	since	they	were	presented,	they	retain	
the	informal	flavor	of	the	original	exchange.			
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On	Native	to	the	Republic	
By	
Lia	Brozgal,	Department	of	French	and	Francophone	Studies,	UCLA	
	 Minayo	Nasiali’s	Native	to	the	Republic	proposes	an	answer	the	following	question:	
what	can	examining	everyday	life	at	the	local	level	tell	us	about	twentieth-century	France?1	(x)	
Beginning	from	this	broad	over-arching	concern,	the	book	expertly	delineates	a	series	of	
interrelated	areas	of	inquiry,	methodically	narrowing	its	scope	to	a	discreet	geographic	zone	
(the	southern	port	city	of	Marseille),	at	a	specific	time	(from	1945	to	the	early	naughts),	and	
with	a	particular	problem,	that	is,	the	“messy”	context	in	which	the	notions	of	“welfare	and	
housing	came	to	be	understood”	and	articulated	as	“essential	social	rights.”	(8)	
	 It	would	be	fair	to	say	that	Native	to	the	Republic	a	book	about	housing.	Set	in	the	
context	of	postwar	rebuilding	and	grand	national	projects	of	modernization,	the	book	zeroes	in	
on	housing	crises	in	Marseille	and	state	and	local	responses	to	them.	Each	chapter	deals	with	an	
aspect	of	lodging	and	the	underclasses—slum	clearing;	family	relocation;	squatter’s	rights	(or	
lack	thereof);	modernization	initiatives;	low-cost	housing	projects	such	as	HBM,	and	HLM;	
“reduced-norm	tenements;”	and	so	forth.	The	methods	here	involve	a	careful	consideration	of	
“everyday”	practices,	of	common	sense	ideas,	and,	most	importantly,	of	the	role	played	by	
ordinary	people	in	shaping	state	and	institutional	responses	to	issues	of	housing;	that	is,	in	
deciding	who	deserves	a	home,	what	kind	of	home	a	given	family	deserves,	and	how	new	
spatial	organizations	of	daily	are	configured	and	policed.	Nasiali	has	gone	looking	for	voices	of	
these	“ordinary	people”	in	archives,	minutes	from	neighborhood	meetings,	published	
interviews,	the	press,	community-run	resources,	and	in	her	own	conversations	with	residents	of	
Marseille.	A	“bottom-up”	approach	such	as	this	one	is	somewhat	novel	in	the	context	of	post-
war	studies	of	French	housing,	which	have	tended	to	focus	on	“the	central	state,	centralized	
institutions,	and	the	work	of	elite	functionaries.”	(8)	And	yet,	the	lines	of	inquiry	in	Native	to	the	
Republic	are	not	univalent	but	multidirectional.	Nasiali	is	keenly	attuned	to	the	fact	that	a	story	
told	from	the	grassroots	level	does	important	work	to	recuperate	lost	and	muted	voices.	At	the	
same	time,	it	remains,	nonetheless,	only	a	part	of	the	story.	Thus,	her	work	involves	a	judicious	
blending	of	both	“bottom	up”	and	“top	down”	narratives—the	latter	of	which	include	urban	
planning	documents,	demographic	studies,	maps,	minutes	from	meetings	of	local	and	national	
politicians,	and	debates	among	key	actors	in	the	housing	industry,	including	urbanists,	
architects,	demographers,	and	sociologists.	This	approach	is	best	understood	through	Nasiali’s	
own	neat	cinematographic	metaphor,	in	which	she	describes	alternatively	“zooming	in	to	
illustrate	low	local-level	issues	have	played	a	formative	role	in	shaping	national	discussions”	and	
then	“zooming	out	to	show	how	national	debates	have	informed	local	politics.”	(17)	
																																								 																				
1 Minayo Nasiali, Native to the Republic: Empire, Social Citizenship and Everyday Life in Marseille since 1945 
(Cornell UP, 2016). 
 
2 See Patrick Weil, “Le statut des musulmans en Algérie coloniale: une nationalité française dénaturée,” Histoire de 
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	 The	book	is	divided	into	two	parts.	Part	1,	Modernizing	the	Imperial	City,	takes	us	from	
the	early	post	war	years	up	through	the	early	1960s,	a	period	bookended,	effectively,	by	
“postwars”—the	Algerian	War	having	ended	in	1962,	with	significant	ramifications	for	Marseille	
and	its	environs.	This	era,	not	coincidentally,	corresponds	to	what	is	known	in	France	as	les	
trente	glorieuses,	the	glorious	thirty,	or	the	postwar	“economic	miracle”	that	saw	important	
shifts	in	demographics	and	the	politics	of	housing.	These	chapters	chart	the	emergence	of	a	
“right	to	housing”	discourse	that	would	subsequently	evolve	to	claim	“the	right	to	a	certain	kind	
of	housing,”	that	is,	not	just	a	roof	over	one’s	head	but	a	home	with	a	certain	level	of	comfort	
and	modern	appliances.	The	final	chapter	of	the	first	part	of	the	book	weaves	a	fascinating	tale	
about	the	politics	of	clearing	one	particular	Marseilles	slum,	a	site	known	as	Peysonnel,	and	the	
relocation	of	its	inhabitants	to	Marseille’s	first	reduced-norm	housing	development,	ironically	
named	La	Paternelle.		In	this,	as	in	all	three	chapters	of	the	first	part,	we	are	introduced	to	the	
complicated	web	of	issues	surrounding	housing—patronage	politics,	clientelisme,	and	the	
import	of	colonial	policy	and	institutions	(such	as	the	Constantine	Plan)	from	Algeria	to	the	
mainland.		
	 We	are	also	given	a	glimpse	of	the	rampant	corruption	for	which	the	city	is	so	notorious.	
Marseille’s	status	as	a	“mobbed-up”	town	with	a	seedy	underbelly	is	the	stuff	of	urban	legends	
in	France,	and	this	odd	combination	of	Mediterranean	grit	and	glamour	is	richly	encoded	in	
cultural	productions.	Recent	examples	include	the	feature	film	La	French	(The	Connection,	
2014).	Set	in	the	1970s,	the	historical	fiction	recounts	the	era	of	the	“French	connection,”	when	
Marseille	served	as	entry	port	and	processing	point	for	opium	travelling	from	Turkey	and	then	
on	to	the	rest	of	Europe	and	North	America—while	local	government	and	law	enforcement	
looked	the	other	way	(and	benefitted	handsomely).	The	Netflix	noir	series	Marseille	(2016)	is	
set	in	murky	swampland	of	Marseillais	politicos,	with	Gérard	Depardieu	playing	a	junkie	of	a	
mayor	running	for	an	nth	term	in	office.	Although	Nasiali	does	not	dwell	on	the	seamy	side	of	
the	city,	preferring	neutral	terms	like	“patronage	politics”	to	“corruption,”	the	book	does	offer,	
now	and	again	glimpses	of	what	can	only	be	called	“legalized”	corruption	schemes.	Gaston	
Defferre,	after	all,	was	mayor	of	the	city	for	32	years,	a	kind	of	super-mandate	brought	to	an	
end	only	when	he	died	in	office.	And	during	his	reign,	in	pure	French	fashion,	Deferre	
“cumulated	mandates,”	serving	as	Ministre	d’outre	mer	under	Guy	Mollet	(1956-57),	Ministre	
d’État,	de	l’intérieur	et	de	la	décentralisation	under	Mitterrand	(1981-1984),	and	as	a	
representative	of	the	Bouches	du	Rhône	region	(1962-1981).	
	 Part	2	of	Native	to	the	Republic,	“The	Welfare	City	in	Decline,”	starts	where	the	Algerian	
war	ends,	with	the	massive	influx	of	both	European	and	Muslim	Algerians	to	France	and	
specifically	to	Marseille	(for	reasons	of	proximity	and	climate).	Each	of	the	three	chapters	
focuses	on	a	particular	decade	(60s,	70s,	and	80s),	but	never	losing	sight	of	continuities	over	
time.	Chapter	4	focuses	on	the	nexus	of	housing	issues	related	to	the	relocation	of	pieds	noirs,	
on	one	hand,	and	“Muslim	refugees”	(or	“migrant	workers”),	on	the	other.	Chapters	5	and	6	
dive	into	the	grands	ensembles,	or	cités,	the	estates	or	housing	projects,	which,	by	the	70s	and	
80s,	had	fallen	into	gross	disrepair.	These	chapters	contend	with	issues	explored,	at	an	earlier	
moment,	in	the	first	part	of	the	book—such	as	who	has	a	right	to	a	house,	a	home?—filtering	
them	through	the	politics	of	Mitterrand-era	social	and	urban	renewal.	Chapter	6	in	particular	
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deals	with	daily	life	and	youth	culture	in	the	banlieue,	and	how	the	work	of	local	associations	
attempts,	through	culture	and	sport,	to	undo	some	of	the	constraints	placed	on	the	everyday	
by	a	certain	politics	of	housing	whose	emergence	has	been	traced	throughout	the	book.		
	 But	to	call	Native	to	the	Republic	a	book	about	housing	would	be	like	calling	Said’s	
Orientalism	a	book	about	the	“Orient”;	in	other	words,	it	would	be	to	mostly	miss	the	point.	
Housing,	as	Nasiali	reveals,	is	not	simply	a	material	good,	nor	can	it	be	reduced	to	an	easy	
symbol	of	belonging,	to	a	notion	of	le	foyer,	or	a	place	to	call	home.	It	is	about	welfare	and	well	
being,	and	about	who	can	claim	these	as	rights.	Housing	in	Marseille,	in	the	post	WWII	era,	is	
nothing	less	than	the	stage	upon	which	numerous	social	actors—ordinary	people	and	
entrenched	politicians,	experts	and	laypeople,	“français	de	souche,”	immigrants,	and	former	
colonial	subjects—perform	their	anxieties	about	the	end	of	empire	and	the	fate	of	the	republic.	
These	anxieties	have	to	do	with	belonging,	citizenship,	and	equality;	they	are	the	growth	pains	
of	postcolonial	modernity;	they	reach	deep	into	the	core	of	a	nation	that	has	defined	itself	as	a	
champion	of	human	rights,	and	for	which	the	negotiation	difference	was	a	foundational,	ethical	
question.	And	so	Native	to	the	Republic	is	not	really	about	housing,	but	rather	about	what	is	
done	with	a	difference.		
	 Now,	one	might	argue	that	France	writ	large	was	the	staging	ground,	after	WWII,	for	
working	out	these	particular	anxieties	and	issues.	But	Nasiali	makes	a	case	for	Marseille	as	both	
exemplary	(a	microcosm	of	a	broader	“messy	context”)	and	exceptional	(by	virtue	of	its	
geographical	position	and	demographics).	It	is	a	city	“located	at	the	crossroads	of	metropole	
and	colony,”	and	“neighborhoods	in	the	port	city	of	Marseille	are	a	dynamic	terrain	where	
diverse	people	made	sense	of	the	broader	modernizing	project	and	the	changing	imperial	
project.”	(3)	It	is,	today,	the	city	in	France	with	the	largest	Muslim	population;	it	was,	in	the	
early	60s,	the	city	that	perhaps	most	closely	reproduced	the	structures,	logic,	and,	perhaps,	the	
affect	of	the	colony	(namely,	of	Algeria).	We	see	this,	for	example,	in	Chapter	4,	which	explores	
both	the	ideological	and	pragmatic	solutions	to	the	housing	crises	in	the	early	60s.	Fast,	
efficient	solutions	were	needed	for	both	pieds	noirs	and	“Muslim	refugees”;	both	would	have	
the	“right	to	housing,”	but	this	right	would	be	managed	under	very	different	regimes.	The	pieds	
noirs	would	be	granted	the	right	to	a	certain	kind	of	housing,	that	is,	a	home	built	with	higher	
quality,	longer	lasting	materials.	As	Nasiali	reminds	us,	“Even	in	the	use	of	building	materials,	
the	ministry	of	the	rapatriés	(pieds-noirs)	emphasized	permanence:	integrating	the	European	
rapatriés	into	the	national	fabric	was	to	ensure	their	long-term	status	as	French	citizens.”	(91)	
The	Algerians,	however,	reclassified	as	foreigners,	or	as	“Muslim	refugees,”	had	no	status	as	
French	citizens,	thus	prompting	the	question:	would	they	still	have	access	to	social	welfare?	
What	were	the	state’s	responsibilities	vis-à-vis	what	might	be	a	temporary,	transient	
population?	The	housing	solutions	for	“Muslim	refugees”	or	“migrant	workers”	did	not	
emphasize	permanence;	to	the	contrary,	the	lodging	structures	proposed	included	camps,	
foyers	(or	dormitories),	and	cités	de	transit	(similar	to	reduced-norm	housing	projects).	
Municipalities	became	less	energetic	when	it	came	to	slum	clearance,	allowing	some	of	the	
established	bidonvilles	to	remain	in	place,	becoming	semi-permanent	favela-type	villages.		
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	 In	the	immediate	postwar	period,	modernization	projects	had	both	practical	and	
“mythical”	dimensions,	and	these,	of	course,	were	linked.	The	practical	side	stemmed	from	the	
fact	that	a	war-damaged	infrastructure	needed	to	be	rebuilt	and	a	massive	housing	crisis	
needed	to	be	addressed.	Of	course,	at	issue	with	the	housing	crisis	at	the	time	was	not	simply	a	
lack	of	space,	but	rather	the	nature	of	that	space,	which	was	degraded	and	often	ad	hoc,	
lacking	in	the	planning	and	technology	that	would	ensure	basic	sanitation	and	livability.	
Concerns	about	how	low-quality	housing	and	a	lack	of	infrastructure	might	create	the	
conditions	for	“poverty,	disease,	criminality	and	urban	blight,”	which	in	turn	contribute	to	the	
“decline	of	the	nation,”	(2)	were	not	new	to	the	post-war	era;	what	was	new,	however,	was	the	
connection	between	the	“everyday”	(the	practical)	and	its	potential	for	“uplift”--the	notion	that	
a	citizen	with	dignified	living	conditions	is	a	better	citizen,	a	citizen	who	will	assist	in	
rejuvenating	the	nation	and	restoring	its	glory.	Policymakers,	politicians,	and	other	stakeholders	
of	the	era	were	drawn	to	theories	such	as	“social	citizenship,”	articulated	by	British	sociologist	
TH	Marshall	and	other	mid-century	reformers,	and	defined	as	“the	notion	that	every	citizen	
deserves	a	certain	quality	of	life.”	(3)		
	 I	want	to	pause	on	and	ponder	this	notion	of	“social	citizenship,”	and	also	“citizenship”	
writ	large,	but	I’d	like	to	frame	that	pause	with	a	brief	discussion	of	some	of	the	most	
interesting	primary	material	in	Native	to	the	Republic—a	series	of	letters,	most	of	which	were	
written	in	the	50s	and	60s	by	colonial	subjects	living	in	Marseille	and	in	desperate	need	of	
housing.	As	is	explained	in	the	book,	one	dominant	narrative	of	the	housing	question	in	the	
1970s	and	1980s	focused	on	the	“immigrant	problem”	as	a	major	contributor	to	the	decline	of	
the	welfare	state	and	to	the	physical	degradation	of	housing	itself.	Nasiali’s	research	on	letters	
from	the	1950s	and	60s,	however,	allows	her	to	construct	a	narrative	that	figures	“immigrants”	
(colonial	subjects)	as	active	participants	in	“formative	discussions	about	social	rights”	and,	
perhaps	ironically,	in	propping	up	a	particular	vision	of	the	citizen	worthy	of	a	home.	(49)	
	 For	example,	in	a	letter	from	Mohamed	B.	to	the	mayor	of	Marseille,	this	Algerian	
veteran	foregrounds	his	request	for	a	home	by	insisting	on	the	numerous	medals	he	received	
for	his	service	in	World	wars	I	and	II.	(49)	This	is	only	one	of	several	examples	of	individuals	
using	their	military	service	as	evidence	of	their	loyalty	to	France	and	thus,	by	extension,	as	
evidence	of	their	worthiness	and	their	aptitude	to	receive	quality	housing.	Other	letter	writers	
point	up	their	families’	participation	in	swelling	the	ranks	of	the	French	populace	(at	the	time,	
the	birth	rate	in	France	was	in	decline	and	feeble	demographics	were	a	source	of	national	
concern).	And	in	another	letter,	this	one	from	Abdallah	T.,	the	longstanding	Algerian	resident	of	
Marseille	emphasizes	his	civic-mindedness:	“I	have	lived	in	Marseille	for	21	years	and	always	
conducted	myself	well	and	done	my	duty	like	all	citizens.”	(49)	
	 This	phrase,	“like	all	citizens,”	creates	an	equivalence	between	Abdallah	T.	any	other	
“pure-blooded”	Frenchman	living	in	Marseille.	But	of	course,	the	fact	that	Abdallah	has	to	insist	
that	he	is	“like	all	citizens”	ironically	reveals	the	degree	to	which	he	is,	in	fact,	not	like	all	other	
citizens,	that	is,	not	like	those	whose	citizenship	can	be	taken	for	granted.	He	is	Algerian:	
technically	French	since	1946,	yet	in	a	position	of	having	to	argue	for	his	rights.		
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	 This	brings	us	back	to	where	we	paused,	that	is,	to	the	notion	of	citizenship—social	or	
otherwise.	The	treatment	of	the	complexities	of	citizenship	is	an	interesting	tangle	within	the	
argument	of	Native	to	the	Republic.	When	it	comes	to	the	Algeria,	for	example,	the	book	seems	
to	glide	smoothly	over	the	extremely	rocky	terrain	of	Empire	and	citizenship	(with	the	
exception,	perhaps	of	Chapter	4).	As	Nasiali	rightly	points	out,	the	Lamine	Gueye	Law	of	1946	
made	Muslim	Algerian	colonial	subjects	French	citizens.	(The	Jews	of	Algeria	had	been	made	
French	via	the	Crémieux	Decree	in	1870).	The	text	of	the	Lamine	Gueye	Law	reads:	
À	partir	du	1er	juin	1946,	tous	les	ressortissants	des	territoires	d'outre-mer	(Algérie	
comprise)	ont	la	qualité	de	citoyen,	au	même	titre	que	les	nationaux	français	de	la	
métropole	et	des	territoires	d'outre-mer.	Des	lois	particulières	établiront	les	conditions	
dans	lesquelles	ils	exerceront	leurs	droits	de	citoyens.		
Beginning	June	1,	1946,	all	ressortissants	(nationals,	citizens)	of	overseas	territories	
(including	Algeria)	are	granted	citizenship,	just	as	French	nationals	of	the	metrople	and	
overseas	territories.	Special	laws	will	establish	the	conditions	in	which	they	will	
exercise	their	rights	as	citizens.	(Emphasis	mine)	
Certainly,	Lamine	Guèye	made	Algerians	(and	other	colonial	subjects)	French	on	paper,	but	
what	of	these	special	laws	that	would	“establish	the	conditions	in	which	they	will	exercise	their	
rights	as	citizens”?	What	are	the	conditions	of	citizenship?	If	they	were	citizens	just	as	those	
French	nationals	in	the	metropole,	why	would	their	rights	be	any	different?	Moreover,	what	is	
known	about	the	application	of	Lamine	Gueye?	Did	it	enter	into	use,	or	was	it	an	essentially	
empty	gesture?	After	all,	it	is	worth	remembering	that	from	the	40s	through	the	early	60s,	
Algerians	living	in	France	were	considered	“FMA,”	or	French	Muslims	of	Algeria.	They	did	not	
enjoy	the	same	rights	as	“native”	French	citizens,	and	were	often	targeted	by	the	police	as	a	
minority	group	and	subjected	to	racial	profiling	and	violence.	(The	police	massacre	of	October	
17,	1961	is	only	beginning	to	be	recognized	for	what	it	was:	state-sponsored	racial	violence.)	At	
the	time	of	independence	in	1962,	only	10,000	Algerian	Muslims	were	“fully	French”	(and	those	
who	were	had	either	been	naturalized	or	had	a	naturalized	parent),	and	this	fact	suggests	
Lamine	Gueye	may	have	been	an	essentially	toothless	declaration.2		
	 Native	to	the	Republic	perhaps	misses	an	opportunity	to	engage	this	question	on	a	more	
granular	level.	In	the	second	part	of	the	book	(part	4),	the	quagmire	of	citizenship	and	rights	is	
more	visible.	In	the	immediate	aftermath	of	the	Algerian	War,	one	official	observes,	in	an	
episode	of	classic	Gaulois	understatement,	“the	status	of	Algerians	in	France	is	less	than	
completely	defined.”	(93)	What	isn’t	fully	problematized	is	whether	or	not	this	moment	
constitutes	a	significant	rupture	in	the	treatment	of	Algerians,	and	in	the	institutional	hesitancy	
to	consider	them	“French”	like	all	citizens,	or	whether	it	represents,	in	fact,	the	continuity	of	a	
chaos	that	already	haunted	the	colonial	project	in	Algeria	(and	elsewhere)?	As	Patrick	Weil	has	
put	it,	“in	the	case	of	Algeria,	the	republican	regime	pushed	to	the	maximum	the	confusion	
																																								 																				
2 See Patrick Weil, “Le statut des musulmans en Algérie coloniale: une nationalité française dénaturée,” Histoire de 
la justice, vol 16, no 1 (2005), 93-109. 
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between	the	word	of	law	and	the	reality	of	lived	experience,	emptying	the	terms	‘nationality’	
and	‘equality’	of	their	significance.”3	
	 Beyond	the	particularities	of	colonial	citizenship,	or	even	the	specifically	Algerian	
valences	of	citizenship	during	and	just	after	colonization,	the	question	of	social	citizenship	is	a	
keyword	in	the	book,	one	that	could	also	benefit	from	additional	contextualization	and	probing.	
A	concept	borrowed	from	English	sociologist	JT	Marshall,	social	citizenship	hails	from	the	time	
when	the	structure	of	the	British	welfare	system	was	being	articulated,	and	was	broadly	
defined	as	the	understanding	that	every	citizen	deserves	a	certain	quality	of	life.	(3)	
	 It	seems	worth	wondering	about	the	“applicability”	of	this	notion	to	the	French	state,	
with	its	particular	conception	of	citizenship.	For	Marshall,	citizenship	was	to	be	understood	as	
composed	of	three	strands:	civil	citizenship,	exemplified	by	freedom	of	speech,	property	rights,	
and	access	to	justice;	political	citizenship,	or	“the	right	to	participate	in	the	exercise	of	political	
power,”	as	an	elector	or	public	servant;	and	social	citizenship,	or	“a	whole	range	from	the	right	
to	a	modicum	of	economic	welfare	and	security	to	the	right	to	share	to	the	full	in	the	social	
heritage	and	to	live	the	life	of	a	civilized	being	according	to	the	standards	prevailing	in	the	
society.”4	How	does	this	resonate	with	or	grate	against	French	notions	of	citizenship,	which	
seem	to	have	been	more	“holistic”	from	the	outset,	at	least	in	theory?	Is	“social	citizenship”	
problematic	(irrespective	of	national	context),	insofar	as	it	pokes	holes	in	the	notion	of	any	kind	
of	unitary	citizen?	What	does	it	mean	that	two	individuals	can	both	be	“citizens”	(in	the	civil	
sense),	yet	one	might	lay	claim	to	a	certain	range	of	housing	and	social	services	(welfare),	
whereas	another	might	not?	Coming	back	to	my	initial	series	of	questions	about	citizenship,	
how	does	a	law	like	Lamine	Gueye	in	fact	reflect	a	more	British	understanding	of	citizenship	
than	France	may	have	been	willing	to	admit,	at	the	time?		
	 Given	the	above,	it	seems	fair	to	lament	that	the	title	of	the	book,	which	promises	
perhaps	a	more	incisive	comment	about	belonging,	is	never	unpacked	or	mined	for	its	
metaphorical	power	to	move	beyond	the	quagmire	of	administrative	notions	of	citizenship.	
What	does	it	mean,	after	all,	to	be	“native	to”	the	“Republic”?	What	notions	are	couched	in	this	
unusual	prepositional	expression	“to,”	which	more	readily	conjures	up	plants	and	animals	than	
people?	And	yet,	this	may	be	precisely	Nasiali’s	point:	at	a	given	point	in	time,	in	a	particular	
place,	a	group	of	people,	irrespective	of	their	diverse	origins,	may	well	have	understood	
themselves	as	“native	to”	the	Republic—as	existing	in,	and	belonging	to	it,	by	nature.		
	 Founded	at	a	site	of	intense	cross-cultural	traffic,	Marseille—or	Massalia,	as	it	was	
known	to	its	founding	Greek	fathers	in	600	BC--was	France’s	first	city.	Today,	it	is	a	European	
Cultural	Capital	and	the	largest	French	city	in	terms	of	area.	Situated	in	a	region	that	now	home	
to	an	important	community	of	pieds	noirs	and	their	descendants,	Marseilles	is	also	home	to	the	
hexagon’s	largest	Muslim	population.	One	of	the	most	interesting,	overarching	
accomplishments	of	Native	to	the	Republic	may	its	ability	to	train	our	gaze	away	from	Paris	and	
its	centrality	(in	everything),	and	to	remind	us	that	there	is	more	to	France	than	its	capital.		
																																								 																				
3 Weil, 109. 
4 JH Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class (Cambridge UP, 1950), 10-11.  
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Comment	on	Native	to	the	Republic	by	Minayo	Nasiali	
by	
Swanie	Potot		
Research	Unit	on	Migration	and	Society,	French	National	Center	for	Scientific	Research	
	
1. WHAT	I	APPRECIATED:	
I	would	like	to	begin	by	saying	that	I	really	appreciate	your	work,	Minayo,	as	it	proposes	
an	original	approach	to	the	problem	of	assimilation.	By	addressing	the	issue	of	French	
citizenship	through	the	prism	of	post	war	housing	policies,	you	tackle	a	well-known	subject	in	a	
novel	way.	Your	book	asks:	"How	does	the	(re)	construction	of	housing	reconfigure	the	link	
between	citizens	and	the	state?"	And	by	implication,	it	also	poses	the	question	of	how	the	(re)	
construction	of	housing	draws	a	border	between	the	people	of	the	state	–	whose	well-being	the	
state	maintains	--	and	those	to	be	kept	apart	from	the	nation?		Because	your	material	comes	
from	letters	sent	by	citizens	and	highlights	the	importance	of	local	politics	you	manage	to	deal	
with	these	questions	in	a	very	convincing	way.		Your	book	reminds	me	of	the	way	in	which	
Rogers	Brubaker	analyzed	“everyday	life	ethnicity”	in	Romania,5	showing	that	politics	has	
various	dimensions	which	can	be	understood	at	the	level	of	political	leaders	or	at	the	level	of	
ordinary	people.		In	this	light,	one	can	understand,	just	as	you	show,	how	real	politics	carried	
out	on	the	ground	involves	a	perpetual	negotiation	between	various	actors	and	does	not,	in	any	
manner,	involve	a	simple	top-down	procedure.		
While	I	find	your	book	very	convincing,	the	argument	to	follow	reflects	the	moment	that	
produced	this	comment,	namely	an	encounter	between	an	author	and	her	critics.		While	I	
highlight	points	of	disagreement,	the	criticisms	to	follow	reflect	the	very	great	interest	I	had	
reading	this	fine,	precise	work,	which	relies	on	meticulous	research	and	a	good	knowledge	of	
the	French	environment.	
2.	GENERAL	REVIEW:	
I	am	a	sociologist,	and	a	French	one;	consequently,	my	review	addresses	the	conceptual	
framework	of	your	study.		As	the	book	puts	you	in	between	America	(where	you	are	likely	to	
find	most	of	your	readers	and	where	you	received	your	training)	and	France	(where	you	carried	
out	your	research)	and	you	use	concepts	that	possess	different	meanings	in	the	two	
environments,	I	think	that	the	framework,	while	reliable,	is	not	fully	precise,	in	particular	as	
regards	questions	related	to	multiculturalism	and	race,	issues	which	I	will	now	address:		
2.1.	MULTICULTURALISM:	
																																								 																				
5	Rogers	BRUBAKER,	«	Ethnicity,	race,	and	nationalism	»,	Annual	Review	of	Sociology,	2009,	vol.	35,	p.	21–
42.	
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In	my	view,	the	word	takes	on	different	realities	and	has	different	normative	dimensions	
in	France	and	in	the	U.S.	In	both	places,	multiculturalism	says	something	about	the	place	of	
communities	and	communitarianism.	But	in	France,	unlike	in	the	Anglo-Saxon	world,	
communitarianism	is	seen	as	a	political	problem,	as	something	that	is	denounced.	In	the	French	
context,	the	fact	that	people,	especially	migrants,	simultaneously	belong	to	the	national	
(French)	community	as	well	as	their	own	community	of	origin	is		source	of	social	tension.	For	
most	of	the	French	people,	communitarism	is	not	a	good	way	to	live	together,	to	make	society.	
Furthermore	it	is	in	contradiction	with	the	republican	project	which	considers	French	society	to	
be	an	indivisible	whole.	If	you	are	to	be	integrated	in	the	French	nation,	then	you	are	supposed	
to	leave	all	other	forms	of	belonging	to	the	private	sphere.	Since	the	French	Revolution,	
communities	are	traditionally	thought	of	as	being	opposed	to	the	nation.		From	this	
perspective,	the	French	people	is	a	single	entity	and	cannot	be	divided	into	various	groups	
based	on	interest	or	origin.		In	our	classes	on	migration	a	central	goal	is	that	of	getting	our	
students	to	understand	that	the	Anglo-Saxon	model	does	not	reject,	and	even	values,	the	
existence	of	different	communities	of	origin.		
In	France,	institutions,	first	and	foremost	the	school,	have	the	function	of	reducing	these	
differences	so	that	everyone	adheres	to	a	model	of	common	citizenship.	By	contrast,	
multiculturalism	is	associated	with	a	communitarian	vision	of	society.	
You	present	the	1980s	protests	of	the	second	generation	of	North	African	immigrants	as	
part	of	multiculturalist	demands	for	a	"right	to	be	different".	I	think	that	there	is	confusion	
here;	at	least	for	a	French	reader	there	is	something	that	does	not	work,	especially	if	we	have	in	
mind	the	present	situation.	
The	1983	Beurs’	march	(	“Marche	des	Beurs”)	or,	later,	France	Black,	Blanc,	Beurs	
(soccer	1998),	did	not	involve	a	call	to	communitarianism	or	multiculturalism,	but	rather	a	
demand	to	enlarge	the	French	nation	so	as	to	better	integrate	(or	assimilate)	foreigners	and	
their	descendants.		These	mobilizations	took	as	point	of	departure	the	idea	that	immigrants	
would	want	to	join	the	fundamental	values	of	France:	secularism,	adhesion	to	the	republican	
project,	and	membership	in	a	single	and	indivisible	nation.	The	national	project	is	not	
challenged	by	these	claims.	While	you	write	that	these	protestors	asked	for	a	right	to	be	
different,	it	was	more	a	demand	for	a	right	to	be	included	in	the	majority	(a	right	for	
INdifference).	In	this	sense,	the	march	of	the	Beurs	which	called	itself	the	march	for	equality	
was	not	at	all	opposed	to	the	republican	model.	On	the	contrary,	it	testified	to	the	adhesion	of	
the	children	of	immigrants	to	this	model.	That's	why	it	was	supported	by	the	socialist	
government	(just	as	you	mention).	But	meanwhile,	and	continuing	on	until	now,	the	socialist	
party	has	fought	against	any	form	of	communatarianism	and	is	opposed	to	a	multiculturalist	
vision	of	the	society.	
These	protests	of	the	1980s	differ	deeply	from	more	modern,	“post-colonial”	demands	
of	the	current	day.	This	new	protest	movement	–rooted	in	the	same	social	groups	mentioned	in	
your	book	but	involving	the	third,	not	second	generation	--	indeed	demands	respect	for	long	
lasting	differences,	differences	that	are	expressed	in	terms	of	cultural	origins	or	religious	
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belonging.	Thus,	contending	that	it	was	imperative	to	«	concentrate	on	the	«	racialized	»,	just	
like	us,	who	experience	the	same	oppressions	as	us	and	who	need	to	exchange	opinions	on	just	
such	questions,”	two	anti-racist	activists	organized	a	“de-colonial	summer	camp”	in	2016,	open	
only	to	those	with	“a	personal	experience	of	state	racism.”			As	they	saw	it,	the	republican	
model	may	be	egalitarian	on	the	paper,	but	discriminates	in	practice,	since	it	rejects	the	
legitimacy	of	any	effort	by	racial	or	ethnic	sub-categories	of	the	population	to	mobilize	on	their	
own.		
	In	contrast	to	the	mobilization	of	the	1980s	with	their	call	for	a	more	expansive	French	
nation	that	would	include	immigrants	and	their	descendants,	but	within	the	dominant	
republican	model,	this	latest	struggle	against	discrimination	instead	calls	on	minorities	to	lay	
claim	to	their	differences	in	order	to	better	defend	their	access	to	collective	resources.	The	
French	traditional	republican	model,	which	denies	individual	or	community	differences,	is	
perceived	here	as	an	instrument	of	domination	in	the	hands	of	whites	(opposed	to	racialized	
groups).	This	movement,	for	whom	the	figures	of	reference	are	activists	and	thinkers	such	as	
Malcolm	X	or	Frantz	Fanon,	holds	a	differentialist	conception	of	society	and	anti-racism	and	
supports	the	implementation	of	policies	of	positive	discrimination	(or	affirmative	action)	which	
does	not	legally	exist	in	France.6		
I	think	that	the	comparison	of	this	present	movement	with	the	period	of	the	1980s	
described	in	the	book	illuminates	the	nature	of	that	earlier	experience	and	allows	us	to	better	
understand	how	the	choice	of	the	expressions	of	"right	to	difference"	and	"multiculturalism"	in	
your	book	can	be	problematic	for	a	French	reader.		
2.2.	RACE	
My	second	criticism	concerns	your	use	of	the	notion	of	race.	You	use	this	term	many	
times	and	sometimes,	I	think,	with	a	lack	of	caution.	While	sometimes	you	associate	the	
concept	with	empire	and	de-colonization,	in	which	cases	the	notion	of	race	can	indeed	be	
justified,	at	other	times	the	term	is	equivalent	to	the	word	“nationality”.	
Of	course,	this	is	also	my	French	point	of	view	which	guides	my	criticism,	hoping	that	it	
may	interest	American	readers	who,	with	the	exception	of	a	few	specialists	in	the	subject,	are	
not	disturbed	by	this	word	which	is	part	of	the	current	vocabulary	in	the	USA.	I	refer	you	to	an	
article	by	Hans	Siebers,	"Race	versus	ethnicity"7,	in	which	he	explains	why	importing	the	term	
race	into	the	European	scientific	literature	is	problematic.	His	demonstration	relates	to	the	
																																								 																				
6	Further	information	can	be	found	on	the	project’s	webpage	https://ce-decolonial.org/	.	For	
some	elements	of	the	controversy	:	https://www.marianne.net/societe/interdit-aux-blancs-le-
camp-d-ete-decolonial-remet-ca	and	the	organizers’	answer	-	http://contre-
attaques.org/magazine/article/camp-d-ete	.		For	further	background,	see:	Sylvia	Zappi,	“La	non-
mixité	raciale,	outil	d’émancipation	ou	repli	communautaire,”	Le	Monde,	July	28,	2016.	
7	Hans	SIEBERS,	«	“Race”	versus	“ethnicity”?	Critical	race	essentialism	and	the	exclusion	and	oppression	of	
migrants	in	the	Netherlands	»,	Ethnic	and	Racial	Studies,	2017,	vol.	40,	no	3,	p.	369-387.	
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genocide	of	the	Jews	and	the	normative	ideological	aspect	with	which	this	word	is	associated.	I	
will	not	develop	this	approach	here	but	mention	it	only	to	underline	the	difficulties	that	we,	in	
Europe,	have	with	the	racial	narrative.	
	 In	French,	the	term	race	is	banished	from	everyday	language.	Even	when	used	by	
social	scientists	(often	influenced	by	American	literature),	the	word	is	surrounded	by	quotation	
marks,	specifying	that	“race”	is	a	form	of	categorization	that	is	not	based	natural	difference	on	
nature	but	that,	on	the	contrary,	is	constructed	by	social	actors	in	a	given	situation.	In	the	
United	States,	although	scholars	of	interethnic	relations	also	question	the	uses	of	the	concept	
of	race,	some	authors	use	this	term	without	adequate	clarity	or	case,	sometimes	suggesting	
that	race	is	a	tangible	reality,	existing	as	such	independently	of	the	social	report	from	which	it	
emerged.	
	It	seems	to	me	that	your	writing	oscillates	between	the	two	positions.	You	do	not	use	
the	term	without	thinking	about	it	and	putting	it	back	into	context,	but	you	consider	it	is	
enough	to	refer	to	the	colonial	context	to	justify	it.	However,	you	do	not	specify	what	this	
notion	means	for	you	and	why	you	can	speak	of	race	relations	between	mainstream	French	
people	and	the	ex-colonial	subjects	who	have	migrated	to	France.	This	lacuna	suggests	that	the	
racial	dimension	of	public	housing	policies	after	World	War	2	is	inherently	linked	to	the	empire	
and	the	decolonization.	
On	the	one	hand,	I	do	not	disagree	with	you	as	the	former	colonized	people	who	
inhabited	the	slums	were	already	racialized	within	the	colonial	framework.	On	the	other	hand,	I	
would	like	to	suggest	now	that	the	racialization	of	migrant	and	poor	populations	is	far	from	
being	limited	to	the	post-colonial	framework.	
2.2.1 Further	thoughts	on	the	notion	of	race	
For	clarity,	let	me	add	a	few	additional	words	on	race	relations:	As	it	is	approached	by	
most	of	the	social	scientists	the	notion	of	race	relations	relies	on	the	idea	that	differences,	and	
inequalities	are	natural	rather	than	social	processes,	presupposing	that	humanity	is	made	of	
different	parts	–races-	which	do	not	melt.	In	a	racial	perspective,	the	term	generally	assesses	a	
form	of	domination	which	is	thought	of	as	coming	from	the	“nature”,	or	at	least	from	deep	and	
ancient	discrepancies.	It	assumes,	then,	that	social	positions	of	the	groups	are	rigid	because	
they	rely	on	the	fundamental	nature,	on	the	soul	of	the	people,	and	can	hardly	be	changed.	
Most	of	the	time,	the	idea	of	race	relations	presupposes	a	hierarchical	conception	of	humanity.	
Thus,	using	the	term	“race	relations”	does	make	sense	when	one	speaks	of	the	Empire.		
You	argue	that	the	presence	in	France	of	foreigners	from	North	Africa	is	linked	to	the	
experience	of	colonization	/	decolonization.	I	agree	with	you	that	colonization	does	rely	on	a	
conception	of	a	dominant	Europe	and	of	racialized	people	in	the	colonies.	Furthermore,	this	
racialization	of	the	colonized	people	was	taken	into	account	in	the	housing	programs	that	you	
analyzed	and	led	to	the	further	racialization	of	the	housing	issue	and	to	discrimination	against	
North	Africans.		
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My	point,	however,	is	that	this	conceptual	framework	works	because	of	the	period	
studied:	the	post-World	War	II	period	is	marked	by	de-colonization	and	the	end	of	the	Empire.	I	
suggest	that	we	take	some	distance	to	see	how	racialization,	or	at	least	naturalization	of	the	
social	differences	is	a	long	running	process,	especially	when	it	comes	to	studying	migration.	I	
maintain	that	racialization	is	not	anchored	in	the	Empire.	
You	write	(p.103)	for	example	that	the	Arabs	are	the	least	appreciated	immigrants,	
perceived	as	less	inclined	to	integrate	than	the	Italians,	the	Poles,	the	Portuguese...	But,	you	
must	know	that	at	the	end	of	the	19th	century	the	Italians	were	seen	as	impossible	to	
assimilate.	I	refer	here	to	the	violent	racist	riots	that	occurred	in	1893	known	as	the	Massacres	
of	Aigues	Mortes8.	Viewing	migrants	as	people	whose	fundamental,	uncivilized	people	makes	
their	integration	into	modern	cities	impossible	is	an	old	story.	
2.2.2	Example	of	the	Bas-Bretons	in	the	city	of	Nantes	1851	
This	part	of	my	comment	relies	on	a	paper	from		historian,	Didier	Guyvarc'h	9	describing	
a	report	on	housing	in	the	city	of	Nantes	in	1851,	written	by	a	senior	official,	Auguste	Chérot.	
This	report	was	produced	within	the	framework	of	the	law	of	13	April	1850	which	had	required	
cities	to	tackle	unhealthy	dwellings	and	the	problem	of	shantytowns	surrounding	cities.	The	
difficulties	regarding	housing	concerned	various	populations,	but	the	official	makes	a	special	
mention	of	the	Bretons	(migrants	coming	from	the	adjacent	region	of	Brittany)	who,	like	the	
Maghrebians	a	century	later,	seem	to	pose	more	difficulty	to	the	goodwill	of	the	public	services.	
They	are	described	as	asocial,	culturally	distant	from	the	townspeople	of	Nantes	and	whose	
nature	compels	them	to	engage	in	behaviors	that	cannot	be	tolerated	in	a	civilized	space.	
Abstracts	remind	reports	of	Marseilles	officials	you	cited	in	your	book:	
"We	are	convinced	that	it	is	possible,	with	firm	will	and	perseverance,	to	make	the	
necessary	improvements	in	the	unhappy	classes	of	our	city	penetrate;	but,	as	we	must	admit,	
our	hopes	would	be	discouraged	if	the	wretched	districts,	whose	sanitation	we	are	pursuing,	
were	to	be	regularly	infected,	the	word	is	not	too	strong,	by	the	invasions	of	beggars	from	the	
countryside	of	the	Brittany."	
Attributing	the	state	of	advanced	decay	of	the	migrants’	homes	to	the	very	nature	of	the	
Bretons	themselves,	the	rapporteur	advises	against	offering	them	better	housing	because	they	
would	degrade	them.	"Populations,	foreign	to	our	department,	in	which	the	most	repulsive	filth	
is	a	second	nature."		
As	always,	the	hygienic	and	moral	order	is	said	to	be	threaten:	"It	is	a	veritable	plague,	a	
deplorable	plague,	that	the	presence	among	our	populations	of	these	poor	people,	whose	moral	
																																								 																				
8	Gérard	Noiriel,	Le	Massacre	des	Italiens:	Aigues-Mortes,	17	août	1893,	Fayard,	2010.		See	also,	Gérard	
Noiriel,	The	French	Melting-Pot,	Minneapolis	:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	1996.	
	
9	Didier	Guyvarc'h.	"Un	manifeste	de	1851	contre	les	immigrés	bretons."	Genèses	(1996):	137-
144	
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degradation	equals	physical	degradation."	The	author	of	the	article	explains	that	the	presence	
of	these	migrants	threatens	the	entire	city	with	contamination	by	cholera.	
Furthermore,	these	migrants	only	understand	Bas-Breton,	not	French.	
"When	they	have	obtained,	by	begging,	some	coins	of	private	charity,	the	father	and	
often	the	mother	hastened	to	plunge	into	a	frightful	drunkenness	of	brandy,	and	then	
scandalized	the	neighborhood	by	fierce	struggles	and	acts	of	a	revolting	immorality."	
Just	as	you	mention	about	the	North	Africans,	these	people	are	seen	as	illegitimate	
competitors	for	jobs:	"These	nomadic	hordes	are	disastrously	competing	with	our	working	
people	in	the	search	for	work."	As	in	your	book,	we	can	notice	here	the	difference	between	the	
good	poor	and	the	unacceptable	migrants.	
In	conclusion,	the	official	asks	that	the	Bretons	be	expelled	and	that	access	to	the	city	of	
Nantes	be	forbidden	to	them	because	they	cannot	adapt;	as	the	Bretons’	natural	environment	
is	the	countryside,	they	must	be	kept	there	by	the	forces	of	the	State.	
I	believe	that	we	can	speak	here	of	a	vision	expressed	in	terms	of	race,	even	if	it	involves	
a	Frenchman	observing	his	fellow	citizens.	The	Bretons	are	considered	to	be	inferior	beings	who	
are	frozen	in	an	identity	linked	to	their	birth.	The	colonial	relationship	has	no	place	here	but	
obviously	the	problem	of	housing	is	perceived	in	terms	very	similar	to	those	described	in	your	
book.	Thus,	the	tendency	to	naturalize	misery	in	order	to	extract	it	from	the	social	body	is	an	
ancient	and	a	common	practice.	
2.2.3	Roma	and	current	slums	
My	second	example	is	drawn	from	my	current	work	on	Roma	in	France10.	
It	is	interesting	to	note	that	your	book	stops	around	2015	and	that	you	have	focused	on	
the	issue	of	housing	and	that	you	have	remained	focused	on	the	future	of	the	suburbs	without	
even	mentioning	that	the	slums,	of	which	you	describe	the	eradication	during	the	1970’s,	have	
reappeared	since	fifteen	years	in	France.	
In	France,	the	"Roma	question",	which	concerns	the	arrival	of	Roma	from	Eastern	
Europe,	has	returned	the	issue	of	immigrant	slums	to	public	attention	and	political	debate.		
Throughout	France,	85,000	people	live	nowadays	in	makeshift	dwellings,	of	whom	“only”	
25,000	comprise	foreigners	of	Roma	background.	Still,	the	issue	is	treated	as	a	problem	of	
uncontrolled	immigration	just	as	in	the	1950s	the	housing	problem	was	treated	as	a	matter	of	
ethnicity.	Two	recent	French	Prime	Ministers	(Nicolas	Sarkozy	and	Manuel	Valls)	mentioned	in	
their	speeches	the	fact	that	Roma	could	not	be	assimilated	in	France	because	they	were	of	a	
culture	too	different	from	ours.	Using	the	category	you	develop	in	your	book,	they	are	seen	as	
																																								 																				
10	Swanie	Potot,	2018,	Roms,	Tsiganes,	Migrants….	Catégorisations	ethniques	et	frontières	
sociales	en	Europe,	Rennes,	Presses	universitaires	de	Rennes.	
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the	“a-socials”	of	today.	Up	until	now,	the	state’s	main	response	has	not	been	the	launching	of	
large	construction	programs,	but	simply	destroying	shantytowns,	walling	off	the	entrances	to	
squats	and	hunting	beggars	in	the	streets.	
However,	a	few	people	are	chosen	to	benefit	from	a	social	integration	program	through	
housing.	Established	diagnoses	are	very	similar	to	those	you	describe:	the	habits,	morality,		
personal	hygiene,	ability	to	adopt	the	behaviors	of	the	French	middle	class	are	assessed.	Most	
are	excluded	from	these	criteria	and	only	a	few	are	chosen	for	a	try	in	social	housing.	
Here	too,	it	is	undeniable	that	an	analysis	in	terms	of	race	is	relevant:	the	Roma	are	
considered	to	be	naturally	inferior,	inappropriate	for	“normal”	life	and	this	justifies	not	taking	
up	their	social	problems.	Here	too,	it	appears,	as	you	show	in	the	book,	that	housing	policies	
are	also	policies	of	exclusion.	
3.	CONCLUSION	
My	conclusion	is	not	to	say	that	you	are	wrong	in	what	you	describe,	but	to	point	out	
the	fact	that	the	developments	that	you	analyze	in	your	book	take	place	in	a	setting	that	goes	
beyond	the	end	of	the	colonial	empire.	Racialization	has	always	been	a	means	of	delegitimizing	
certain	populations	and	of	removing	their	well-being	from	the	responsibility	of	the	state.	By	
describing	these	populations	as	a-social	and	ascribing	their	behavior	to	their	nature,	one	
transforms	them	into	underserving	poor,	which	in	turn	makes	it	normal	to	keep	them	out	of	the	
social	contract.	Through	the	policies	of	housing,	one	can	see	-	and	this	is	the	strength	of	your	
work	-	how	the	republican	universalistic	project	is	caught	in	its	own	contradictions;	how	by	
choosing	a	particular	population	as	the	legitimate	object	of	its	social	policies,	it	excludes	the	
others	by	sustaining	them	permanently	in	a	position	of	sub-citizens.	
Hannah	Arendt	explains	in	this	sense	that	before	the	Jewish	genocide	took	place	in	
Europe,	there	was	a	long	work	of	racialization	which	consisted	in	removing	the	Jews	from	the	
common	humanity11.	This	is	the	first	step	to	be	followed	by	inhuman	treatment	of	a	population.	
Indeed,	this	way	of	thinking	social	differences	is	not	limited	to	the	Empire	period.	
	 The	whole	point	of	your	book	is	to	show	how	this	process	of	tracing	racial	and	social	
boundaries	is	played	out	on	a	daily	basis,	not	through	the	imposition	of	grand	xenophobic	
ideologies,	but	rather	through	daily,	almost	innocuous,	interactions	involving	civil	servants	and	
racialized	people.	The	American	intellectual	framework	that	you	mobilize	in	this	book	to	
analyze	the	French	situation	thus	highlights	the	racialist	logics	of	a	state	that	refuses	to	consider	
itself	multicultural.	From	this	point	of	view,	your	book	provides	an	undeniable	contribution	to	
the	understanding	of	French	society.	
	 	
																																								 																				
11	Hannah	Arendt.,	1951,	The	Origins	of	Totalitarianism,	New	York,	Brace	and	Co.	
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Response	to	Critics	
By	
Minayo	Nasiali,	Department	of	History,	UCLA	
I	extend	my	warmest	thanks	to	Lia	Brozgal	and	Swanie	Potot	for	making	time	to	read	my	
book.		Their	provocative	comments	have	compelled	me	to	engage	anew	with	my	research,	to	
re-see	the	project,	and	to	confront	potential	blind-spots	in	my	approaches	and	methodologies.		
Most	especially,	their	criticisms	raise	important	questions	about	how—or	if—citizenship	and	
race	can	function	as	viable	categories	of	analysis.		I	am	also	indebted	to	Roger	Waldinger	for	
organizing	the	“Author	Meets	Critic”	session	and	for	inviting	us	to	post	our	responses	in	this	
forum.			
Native	to	the	Republic:		Empire,	Social	Citizenship,	and	Everyday	Life	in	Marseille	since	
1945,	as	Brozgal	so	delightfully	put	it,	is	not	just	a	book	about	housing.	It	takes	housing	as	a	
starting	point	for	investigating	the	very	foundations	of	the	modern	French	welfare	state.		
Following	World	War	II,	a	grave	and	persistent	housing	crisis	shaped	the	contours	of	
reconstruction	and	modernization	in	metropolitan	France.		Ordinary	people	argued	that	a	roof	
overhead	was	not	only	a	fundamental	right,	but	that	it	should	be	a	key	cornerstone	of	the	
nascent	welfare	state.		The	book	argues	that	the	only	way	to	make	sense	of	how	welfare	was	
institutionalized	is	to	examine	how	such	debates	occurred	within	an	imperial	context.		To	this	
end,	the	port	city	of	Marseille	functions	as	a	dynamic	site	at	the	crossroads	of	metropole	and	
colony,	where	local-level	debates	about	housing	were	also	discussions	about	which	residents	
deserved	access	to	supposedly	universal	rights.			
Native	to	the	Republic	is	therefore	very	much	a	book	about	citizenship.		Specifically,	it	
explores	how	Marseille	residents,	including	colonial	subjects,	local	politicians,	urban	planners,	
social	scientists,	and	central	state	technocrats	re-imagined	the	relationship	between	citizen	and	
state.		It	demonstrates	how	neighborhood	negotiations	about	decent	housing	and	minimum	
living	standards	came	to	be	seen	as	social	rights	and	elements	of	a	more	comprehensive	
conception	of	citizenship.		Such	debates	reveal	how	hierarchies	of	difference	became	
embedded	within	developing	housing	and	welfare	institutions.		More	broadly,	this	history	
provides	insight	into	contemporary	debates	about	the	so-called	immigrant	question	in	France.	
I	thus	welcome	Brozgal’s	direction	to	further	problematize	how	the	monograph	deals	
with	citizenship.		On	the	one	hand,	she	asks	whether	Native	to	the	Republic	engages	enough	
with	the	“rocky	terrain	of	Empire	and	citizenship.”		On	the	other	hand,	she	wonders	if	it	is	
appropriate	to	apply	T.H.	Marshall’s	concept	of	social	citizenship	to	a	French	case.		Let	me	start	
with	Brozgal’s	first	criticism	about	the	conditions	of	colonial	citizenship:		We	agree	that	the	
1946	Laine-Guèye	Law	is	important	because	it	abolished	subject	hood	and	granted	all	members	
of	the	empire	citizenship.		But	Brozgal	rightly	asks	if	it	was,	in	reality,	a	toothless	declaration?		
She	points	to	the	example	of	Algeria	and	how,	at	independence	in	1962,	only	10,000	“French	
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Muslims	of	Algeria”	were	considered	“fully	French.”	As	Brozgal	underscores	in	her	comment,	
and	as	I	explain	in	the	book,	the	law	may	have	granted	citizenship	status	to	former	colonial	
subjects,	“but	it	did	not	give	them	full	access	to	the	rights	of	metropolitan	French	citizens”	
(Nasiali,	24).		In	other	words,	embedded	within	the	seemingly	universalistic	gesture	of	making	
citizenship	a	common	right,	were	the	means	for	continuing	exclusion	and	state-sponsored	
violence.		As	I	see	it,	however,	it	is	precisely	this	tension	which	makes	the	law	important.	
As	I	point	out	in	chapter	one,	the	law	was	directed	at	all	French	colonial	subjects,	in	
addition	to	Algerians.		Moreover,	the	fact	that	it	was	introduced—along	with	other	pieces	of	
legislation	such	as	the	law	abolishing	forced	labor—by	newly	elected	African	members	of	the	
French	parliament	reflects	how,	in	the	wake	of	the	war,	colonial	subjects	renewed	their	
demands	for	recognition,	for	political	rights,	and	for	“equal	pay	for	equal	work.”	At	root,	then,	
the	Lamine-Guèye	law	very	much	symbolizes	the	problem	of	citizenship.		Gary	Wilder	offers	a	
useful	conceptualization	of	this	problem	when	he	argues	that	studies	of	empire	and	the	nation-
state	should	not	focus	on	how	universalism	went	wrong	in	the	colonies,	but	should	instead	
investigate	how	oppression,	violence,	and	discrimination	is	built	into	the	very	fabric	of	a	
universalistic	understanding	of	citizenship	and	rights.		Colonial	citizenship	is	not	something	that	
happens	“over	there”	it	manifests,	it	particular	ways,	everywhere	within	the	imperial	nation-
state.			
My	task,	as	I	saw	it,	was	to	make	sense	of	how	the	colonial	project	manifested	in	
Marseille	and	intersected	with	the	modernization	project	in	compelling	ways.		For	example,	the	
book	describes	how	quotidian	negotiations	between	experts	and	ordinary	people	contributed	
to	commonsense	perceptions	that	not	everyone	deserved	access	to	housing.		One	example	is	
my	discussion	about	the	evolution	of	the	term	“asocial,”	which	reflected	both	nineteenth	
century	concerns	about	the	floating	poor	and	dangerous	classes	as	well	as	the	imperial	project	
to	“civilize”	colonial	subjects.		In	the	1950s	and	1960s,	“asocials”	were	understood	to	be	not-yet	
ready	to	move	into	modern	housing,	and	by	extension,	they	were	not-yet-ready	to	assume	the	
full	duties	of	French	citizenship.		Instead,	according	to	this	logic,	they	needed	to	be	educated,	to	
be	civilized,	and	taught	how	to	live	as	responsible	members	of	the	polity.		Included	in	this	
category	were:		impoverished	French,	Italians,	Spanish,	and	colonial	subjects.		Examining	the	
asocial	category	therefore	reveals	how	the	postwar	push	to	create	a	more	expansive	notion	of	
citizenship	also	created	new	spaces	for	exclusion.	In	sum,	I	believe	Brozgal	and	I	are	fighting	the	
same	fight	when	it	comes	to	problematizing	citizenship	and	empire	and	I	wholeheartedly	
embrace	her	suggestion	to	continue	to	push	further	and	to	probe	deeper	in	my	own	research.	
Which	brings	me	to	her	second	criticism:		Does	T.H.	Marshall’s	definition	of	social	
citizenship	“resonate	with	or	grate	against	French	notions	of	citizenship,	which	seem	to	have	
been	more	‘holistic’	from	the	outset,	at	least	in	theory?”		In	other	words,	is	it	a	problem	to	take	
an	ostensibly	British	concept	and	graft	it	onto	a	French	context?		In	my	study,	the	concept	
“social	citizenship”	operates	in	three	key	ways:		First,	and	most	simply,	I	saw	it	as	an	historical	
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artifact.		It	reflects	a	moment	following	World	War	II	when	France	engaged	in	a	broader,	
transnational	conversation	about	a	new	grounds	for	citizenship	based	on	the	idea	of	social	
security.		This	discussion	was	shaped,	in	part,	by	the	conversations	of	French	and	British	social	
reformers	including	Pierre	Laroque	and	T.H.	Marshall	(Nasiali,	3).		
Second,	my	discussion	of	social	citizenship	takes	its	cue,	not	from	British	scholarship,	but	
from	a	very	French	genealogy	of	scholars	who	have	helped	conceptualize	the	terrain	of	what	
they	call	“the	social.”		Building	on	Foucault’s	ideas	of	governmentality,	several	of	his	former	
students,	including	Jacques	Donzelot	and	François	Ewald	began,	in	the	late	1970s	and	1980s,	to	
probe	the	technologies	and	practices	central	to	the	“art	of	government.”		Their	respective	
studies	examined	nineteenth	century	concerns	about	the	social	question	and	the	origins	of	the	
French	welfare	state.		As	Paul	Rabinow	explains	in	French	Modern,	such	work	has	explored	“the	
emergence	of	certain	practices	of	reason”	in	the	construction	of	systems	of	social	security	
(Rabinow	quoted	in	Nasiali,	65).	
My	conception	of	social	citizenship	builds	on	this	discourse	but	also	takes	seriously	the	
idea	that	“the	social”	is	a	terrain	that	has	a	physical,	spatial	element.		To	this	end,	I	would	like	to	
note	that	the	working	title	for	the	book	was	“Building	Social	Space,”	which	was	widely	panned,	
to	my	chagrin,	by	the	reviewers.		Although	I	ultimately	settled	on	a	different	title,	the	idea	that	
citizenship	is	not	just	an	idea,	but	a	concept	embedded	within	and	constructed	as	part	of	the	
built	environment	remains	a	central	point	of	the	book.		Moreover,	a	sense	of	the	spatial	
contours	of	citizenship—as	exemplified	by	the	materiality	of	housing—also	demonstrates	how	
everyday	life	is	an	important	lens	for	understanding	how	social	space	is	fabricated.		In	short,	the	
book	builds	on	the	work	of	Foucault	and	others,	but	also	seeks	to	show	how	the	actions	of	
residents	are	a	constitutive	part	of	this	project.	
The	idea	of	“the	social”	has	not	just	been	explored	by	scholars	working	in	the	
Foucauldian	tradition,	it	also	has	roots	in	French	liberalism.		Pierre	Rosanvallon,	drawing	from	
Rousseau’s	idea	of	the	social	contract,	has	examined	how	the	modern	French	welfare	state	is	
premised	on	the	consent	of	the	people	to	form	a	system	of	social	security	based	on	the	
universal	acceptance	of	risk.		Curiously,	in	La	nouvelle	question	sociale	(The	New	Social	
Question)	he	laments	how,	in	the	last	forty	years	or	so,	the	social	contract	that	made	the	
welfare	state	possible	has	eroded.		He	joins	with	other	experts	as	well	as	large	sectors	of	the	
French	public	by	proclaiming	that	the	welfare	state	is	in	crisis.		Now,	French	welfare	institutions	
are	indeed	faltering	as	the	system	is	crippled	by	high	unemployment	levels	and	by	the	hefty	
pensions	of	retired	baby-boomers.		However,	Rosanvallon	makes	sense	of	these	complicated	
issues	a	bit	differently	than	I	do.		According	to	him,	the	old	system	premised	on	the	acceptance	
of	the	universality	of	risk	has	been	supplanted	by	a	more	fragmented,	individualized	
understanding	of	welfare,	one	grounded	not	on	common	consent,	but	based	in	part	on	a	
discourse	of	victimization.		Rosanvallon	is	particularly	alarmed	that	“increased	knowledge	of	the	
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differences	between	individuals	and	groups	strains	the	bases	of	the	social	contract”	
(Rosanvallon,	30).	
This	characterization	of	the	welfare	state	in	crisis	exemplifies	the	third	way	in	which	
social	citizenship	functions	in	my	book.		Namely,	I	explore	how	the	concept	of	social	citizenship	
is	rooted	in	the	French	notion	of	the	public	sphere,	where	citizens,	supposedly	devoid	of	all	
differences	interact	freely	and	in	equality.		The	book	explores	how	this	idea	of	“the	social”	
serves	to	obscure	difference,	or	to	put	it	another	way,	conceals	the	mechanisms,	practices,	and	
norms	by	which	certain	people	and	groups	have	come	to	be	imagined	as	different,	and	
therefore	not	entitled	to	full	rights.		As	scholars	of	gender	have	shown,	welfare	states	have	
always	been	hierarchical,	and	have	often	decoupled	social	benefits	from	political	rights.		My	
book	builds	on	this	scholarship	to	show	how	colonial	subjects	were	integrated	into—and	helped	
to	define—a	differential	system	of	welfare	in	France.		It	shows	how	access	to	housing,	and	by	
extension,	one’s	place	in	the	nation,	was	often	articulated	in	racialized	terms.	
This	brings	me	to	Swanie	Potot’s	criticism	of	book,	namely	that	the	conceptual	
framework,	my	very	methodology,	is	inherently	Anglo-Saxon,	and	thus	I	misunderstand	how	
questions	of	difference—specifically	of	race—are	conceptualized	in	France.	
This	is	not	the	first	time	I	have	received	this	criticism.		I	am	also	not	alone,	as	it	is	often	
levied	against	other	scholars	(both	anglophone	and	francophone)	who,	like	me,	think	about	
race	in	France.		By	way	of	response,	I	begin	by	engaging	with	a	volume	edited	by	the	French	
scholars,	Didier	Fassin	and	Eric	Fassin	entitled,	De	la	question	sociale	à	la	question	raciale?		
Représenter	la	société	Française	(From	the	social	question	to	the	racial	question?		Representing	
French	society).		This	2006	book	addressed,	head-on,	the	question	of	whether	race	is	a	viable	
category	of	analysis	in	France.		It	explains	how	late	twentieth	century	understandings	of	French	
republicanism	imagine	citizenship	in	abstract	terms	and	how,	following	this	logic,	there	are	not	
supposed	to	be—in	fact,	there	cannot	be—racial	problems	in	France,	only	social	ones.		In	his	
contribution	to	the	volume	Pap	Ndiaye	explains	the	issue	thus:	
“In	France,	the	great	difference	vis-a-vis	the	United	States	is	primarily	a	republican	
ideology	that	is	framed	as	theoretically	indifferent	to	skin	color	and	other	physical	
characteristics.		To	be	French	is	classically	considered	as	a	political	tie	to	the	nation,	which	is	
antithetical	to	all	racialized	visions.		However,	the	French	Empire	developed	by	subjugating	
populations	defined	as	not-white	and	not-civilized,	such	that	they	were	denied	citizenship.		The	
line	demarcating	citizens	and	subject	was	political	and	racial…To	be	French,	was	to	be	
white…The	construction	of	the	French	nation	was	not	exclusively	founded	on	political	terms,	
but	equally	founded	on	racial	terms	(Ndiaye,	in	De	la	question	sociale	à	la	question	raciale,	46).		
Emmanuelle	Saada	builds	on	Ndiaye	in	her	contribution	to	the	volume	by	explaining	
how	understandings	of	race	are	not	foreign	to	the	republican	project	but,	rather,	central	to	it.		
She	also	explains	how	racialization	did	not	just	happen	in	the	colonies	and	to	colonial-subjects,	
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but	was	also	a	process	at	work	in	the	metropole.		She	writes	that	in	the	nineteenth	century,	for	
example,	“the	urban	‘dangerous	classes,’	peasant	populations,	but	also	immigrant	workers	
from	other	European	countries	were	all	conceived	from	the	angle	of	racial	difference.”	As	Saada	
explains,	racial	formation	is	a	process	that	intersects	with	other	dynamic	categories	including	
class	and	gender”	(Saada	in	De	la	question	sociale	à	la	question	raciale,	60).	
The	contributors	to	De	la	question	sociale	à	la	question	raciale	and	others	are	forming	a	
new	generation	of	French	scholars	committed	to	untangling	the	complexities	of	how	difference	
has	been	historically	imagined	in	the	imperial	nation-state	(See:		Sylvain	Pattieu,	Emmanuelle	
Sibeud,	Audrey	Celestine,	Franck	Satierf	and	the	members	of	the	working	group	Les	populations	
noires	en	France).		How	then	do	we	reconcile	their	research	with	Potot’s	assertion	that	“In	
French,	the	term	race	is	banished…?”		Put	another	way,	if	a	dominant	consensus	within	the	
French	academy	is	that	talking	about	race	is	taboo—but	at	the	same	time—some	French	
academics	are	investigating	how	race	has	been	institutionalized,	does	this	make	does	this	make	
their	empirically-grounded	claims	problematic,	or	even	illegitimate?			
Let	me	address	some	of	Potot’s	concerns	about	my	book	more	directly,	especially	as	
they	pertain	to	my	use	of	the	terms	multiculturalism	and	race.		She	writes	that	in	the	French	
context,	multiculturalism	is	associated	with	communitarianism	which	is	“denounced…[because]	
it	is	in	contradiction	with	the	republican	project	which	considers	French	society	to	be	an	
indivisible	whole…From	this	perspective,	the	French	people	is	a	single	entity	and	cannot	be	
divided	into	various	groups	based	on	interest	or	origin.”		She	takes	issue	with	my	
characterization	of	the	1983	“Marche	des	Beurs”	as	she	describes	it,	when	young	people,	many	
of	whom	were	the	children	of	postcolonial	migrants,	staged	a	highly	successful	march	from	
Marseille	to	Paris.12		In	response,	I	must	point	out	that	a	major	goal	of	my	research	is	to	listen	
closely	to	what	historical	actors	actually	say.		To	this	end,	I	explain	in	the	book	how	the	march	
was	coined	the	“Marche	des	Beurs”	by	the	press,	but	was	actually	named	a	“March	for	Equality	
and	Against	Racism”	by	the	activists	themselves.		My	findings	ally	with	Potot	insofar	as	the	
marchers	indeed	were	motivated	by	the	desire	for	inclusion	within	the	nation.		But	as	with	all	
movements,	there	were	several	different	politics	at	work,	not	simply	a	single	unifying	vision	for	
change.		Namely,	one	branch	of	the	movement	as	exemplified	by	the	popular	group	SOS	
Racisme,	broadcast	a	broadly	antiracist	message,	one	that	was	focused	especially	on	
condemning	the	rise	of	the	National	Front.		Another,	less	well	known	group,	Mémoire	Fertile	
distanced	itself	from	SOS	Racisme	and	“insisted,”	as	they	put	it,	“on	the	existence	of	a	
multicultural	France	[and	a]	rupture	with	the	myth	of	a	homogeneous	nation”	(Saïd	Bouamama,	
former	member	of	Mémoire	Fertile,	quoted	in	Nasiali,	139).		Interestingly,	Mémoire	Fertile	
rejected	what	they	saw	as	an	“Anglo-Saxon”	folklorisation	of	culture—or	balkanization	as	they	
put	it—of	society.		They	tried	to	imagine	a	process	for	making	difference—or	diversity—work	
																																								 																				
12	Beur	is	an	inversion	of	the	derogatory	term	Arabe	and	can	thus	be	seen	as	an	appropriation	of	negative	
stereotypes	in	the	tradition	of	the	Négritude	movement	in	interwar	France	and	Black	is	Beautfiul	in	the	United	
States	
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within	the	French	republican	model.		In	short,	they	were	trying	to	re-imagine	republicanism	in	
more	inclusionary	terms,	by	addressing	how	discrimination	was	structurally	embedded	within	
French	institutions.		This	attempt	to	make	multiculturalism	work	within	republicanism,	seemed	
to	me,	a	compelling	conceptual	struggle,	one	that	merited	attention	in	my	book.		
Potot	is	also	concerned	with	how	I	make	use	of	“the	notion	of	race.”		She	writes,	“You	
use	this	term	many	times	and	sometimes,	I	think,	with	a	lack	of	caution.		While	sometimes	you	
associate	the	concept	with	empire	and	decolonization,	in	which	cases	the	notion	of	race	can	
indeed	be	justified,	at	other	times	the	term	is	equivalent	to	the	word	‘nationality.’”		One	place	
to	locate	a	response	is	within	Potot’s	own	comment.		She	write	that	“even	when	used	by	social	
scientists…the	word	[race]	is	surrounded	by	quotation	marks,	specifying	that	‘race’	is	a	form	of	
categorization	that	is	not	based	[on]	natural	differences…but	that,	on	the	contrary,	is	
constructed	by	social	actors	in	a	given	situation.”		I	absolutely	agree	with	this	characterization	
because	it	shows	how	race	functions	as	a	category	of	analysis.		Race—of	course—is	not	a	thing.		
It	is	not	an	essence;	it	is	a	process,	a	dynamic,	and	it	is	socially	and	politically	constructed,	as	
Paul	Gilroy	and	Stuart	Hall	have	explained.		In	other	words,	in	different	particular	historical	
contexts,	different	constellations	of	meaning	converge	to	convey	specific	understandings.		For	
example,	at	times,	as	the	book	demonstrates,	nationality	was	conceived	in	racialized	terms.		In	
1950s	Marseille,	efforts	to	clear	slums	centered	on	the	need	to	categorize	and	classify	residents	
living	in	these	“undesirable”	parts	of	the	city.		Those	residents	were	ordered	in	terms	of	their	
“nationality”	and	local	functionaries	labelled	them:		Italians,	Spaniards,	poor	French	and,	
curiously,	“North	Africans.”		North	Africa,	as	we	know,	is	not	a	country.		It	is	a	region	and	a	
former	part	of	the	French	empire.	But	state	officials	used	it	as	a	particular	marker	of	difference,	
one	that	was	supposed	convey	“North	Africans’”	supposed	inferiority,	or	lack	of	civilization.		
Thus	“nationality”	functioned	as	a	category	that	drew	on	understandings	of	class,	poverty,	and	
perceived	racial	differences	that	were	informed,	in	part,	by	the	colonial	project.			
Later	in	the	book,	different	constellations	of	meaning	show	race	at	work	in	other	
contexts.		In	the	final	chapter,	I	recount	the	tragic	murder	of	a	teenager	named	Ibrahim	Ali	
Abdallah	in	1995.		He	was	gunned	down	by	three	members	of	the	National	Front	while	running	
to	catch	a	bus	home	one	night	in	northern	Marseille.		Following	his	death,	the	National	Front	
falsely	claimed	that	Ibrahim	had	attacked	first,	moreover	they	asserted	that	the	seventeen	year	
old	boy	exemplified	the	problem	of	immigrant	male	criminality	threatening	France.		Ultimately,	
the	three	National	Front	members	were	found	guilty	of	murdering	Ibrahim.		Yet,	in	the	public	
conversation	that	followed,	many	made	sense	of	Ibrahim’s	death	in	terms	of	broader	anxieties	
about	immigrant	young	men	and	whether	they	could	ever	become	responsible	French	citizens.		
This	discussion	reflected	a	broader,	state	driven	effort	to	expand	after-school	programming	in	
French	banlieues	with	the	goal	to	rehabilitate	the	built	environment	and	to	better	integrate	
disenfranchised	immigrant	youth.		Ibrahim	himself	was	a	product	of	this	endeavor	as	he	had	
just	left	a	rehearsal	at	a	local	youth	center	the	night	he	was	killed.		Significantly,	in	the	media	
frenzy	following	Ibrahim’s	death,	few	fully	considered	the	fact	that	Ibrahim	was	not	really	an	
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immigrant.		His	parents	had	come	from	the	Comoros,	an	archipelago	of	islands	in	the	Indian	
Ocean.		While	one	of	the	islands,	Mayotte,	remains	a	French	territory,	the	others	voted	for	
independence	in	1974	which	triggered	a	wave	of	migration	to	France.		This	alone	illuminates	
the	complications	of	the	postcolonial	moment	in	France,	as	many	who	are	labelled	
“immigrants”	are	either	citizens	or	are	from	former	colonies.		In	an	interview	uploaded	to	a	
website	run	by	Comorians	in	Marseille,	one	of	Ibrahim’s	friends,	who	had	been	there	the	night	
Ibrahim	died	but	had	survived	the	shooting,	characterized	his	friend’s	death	differently.		For	
him,	Ibrahim’s	murder	was	not	an	indication	that	France	had	an	immigrant	problem.			Instead	
he	asserted,	“Ibrahim	was	killed	because	he	was	black.”		For	him,	Ibrahim’s	death	only	makes	
sense	if	we	interrogate	how	his	very	presence,	on	a	dark	street,	at	night—perhaps	his	very	
place	in	the	nation—had	been	both	racialized	and	criminalized.			
By	way	of	conclusion,	I	must	recount	that	I	wrote	this	final	chapter	as	the	Trayvon	
Martin	tragedy	unfolded	in	2012.		And	I	was	struck,	as	I	worked,	by	the	terrible	way	in	which	
the	circumstances	of	the	two	murders	resonated	with	each	other.		Ibrahim	was	rushing	to	catch	
the	last	bus	home	the	night	he	was	killed	and	unknowingly	was	running	toward	three	armed	
members	of	the	National	Front	who	were	sitting	in	a	car	parked	next	to	the	bus	stop.	They	had	
been	patrolling	the	area	in	“defense”	of	the	nation.		They	concluded,	as	did	Trayvon	Martin’s	
murderer	about	Trayvon,	that	Ibrahim	must	be	up	to	no	good.		Although	I	was	continually	
confronted	by	some	key	similarities	in	the	two	stories,	I	also	remember	asking	myself,	as	I	
wrote,	if	I	was	projecting?		Was	I	misinterpreting	Ibrahim’s	story	and	therefore	not	doing	him	
justice?		Was	I,	in	actuality,	making	a	French	narrative	fit	into	an	Anglo-Saxon	framework?		
What	does	Anglo-Saxon	even	mean,	anyway,	in	the	context	of	this	research?	
Following	the	“Author	Meets	Critics”	session	last	fall,	Robin	D.G.	Kelley	reminded	me	
that	in	the	United	States	(indeed	also	in	Great	Britain,	in	short	in	the	so-called	Anglo-Saxon	
world)	race	continues	to	be	dismissed	as	a	social	fact	“as	opposed	to	a	biological	or	scientific	
fact,”	let	alone	a	category	of	analysis.		In	an	email	to	me	he	wrote:		“How	many	times	have	we	
heard	that	police	killings	of	unarmed	black	and	brown	people	are	not	about	race	because	they	
are	not	"racially	motivated?”		He	does	not	see	such	dismissals	of	race	to	be	unique	to	the	
United	States—or	even	to	France—but,	in	fact	“fundamental	to	all	Western	liberalism.”		For	
him,	the	irony	is	how	“the	very	Western	Enlightenment	ideals	of	science	and	classification	gave	
rise	to	the	modern	conception	of	race,	the	one	that	the	self-proclaimed	inheritors	of	this	
tradition	now	are	quick	to	disavow.”			
In	sum,	then,	Kelley’s	comments,	read	alongside	Potot’s	and	Brozgal’s	insights,	have	
pushed	me	to	reflect	on	my	own	methodological	motivations	and	blind-spots.		Does	a	book	
about	housing	and	citizenship	in	Marseille	engage	enough	with	the	colonial	project,	as	I	claim	it	
should?		Do	I	see	race	everywhere	when	other	processes	could	be	at	work?		These	
uncomfortable	questions	have	given	me	pause,	but	have	also	encouraged	me	to	consider	
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broader	issues,	including	how	knowledge	is	produced	in	the	academy,	and	how	certain	
“practices	of	reason”	come	to	be	seen	as	legitimate	or	not.	
	
